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Martin van Creveld
Where 9–11 Fits in
Over the last year the events of 9–11 have been discussed from
every possible point of view, beginning with the psychological
effects on people around the world and ending with the impact
on the way they dance in discotheques.1 This paper will not fol-
low the participants in the debate into such esoteric places: in-
stead it will seek to keep our feet on the ground by focusing on
some of the military and political aspects. First we shall ask what
9–11 actually represents. Second, we shall ask how we got there.
Third, it is necessary to say something about what can be done.
Fourth, we shall try to understand where it is taking us.
I.
To put it as briefly as I can, the events of 9–11 have been the
culmination – so far – of a fundamental change in the way wars
are fought.2 Such shifts have not been uncommon in the past.
Think, for example, of the transition from the infantry-based
forces of the Roman Empire to the much smaller, cavalry-cente-
red, ones fielded by medieval principalities; or, mutatis mutan-
dis, of the military revolution that was triggered by the introduc-
tion of firearms from about 1400 on. Each of those, and many
others, were accompanied by far-reaching political, economic,
and social changes. Though it took time, each helped create, and
was in part created by, an entirely new world.
In marked contrast to the recent past, the new kind of war is not
fought by states against each other. Al Qaeda, which stood be-
hind the events of 9–11, neither claims to be a sovereign entity
nor is recognized as such by the remaining states of the world.
Unlike them, it does not have a solid piece of territory over which
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to exercise its sovereignty; nor is its flag among the 190 or so that
decorate the square in front of the United Nations in New York.
Rather it is a loosely organized group of people whose members,
instead of being recognized as citizens by the I.D cards they car-
ry, operate in cells that are isolated from each other out of secu-
rity considerations.3 Communication inside the cells is carried
out on the basis of personal acquaintance and trust. Communica-
tion among the cells is carried out by means of intermediaries
who are only aware of the missions with which they are charged
and are deliberately denied insight into everything else. Much re-
liance is placed on mobile telephones (which are discarded every
week or two), personal computers, Internet cafes, and coded
messages that only the initiated understand. The organization is
said to have cells in no fewer than fifty different countries; many
of its members, including the leaders, are not tied to a single
country but keep moving from one to another. Now they form
links with similar organizations, now they break them in search
of new alliances; too often, the difference between insiders and
outsiders only exists in the imaginations of those who try to trace
them or write about them. Compared to traditional war-making
entities, i.e. states, they are like gnats buzzing around an ele-
phant.
Second, in the new kind of war symbolized by 9–11 the traditio-
nal division of labor between a government that directs, armed
forces that fight and die, and a civilian population that pays and
suffers does not exist in the same form; instead, all three are
mixed together. As the famous videotape of Bin Laden playing
with an assault rifle showed and was undoubtedly meant to show,
to a large extent political leadership, military command, and
fighting overlap. For the same reason, many other leaders of non-
state fighting organizations like to strut about in uniform; it is as
if they deliberately try to show that, not taking the orders of any
state, they are neither civilian nor military but some hard to defi-
ne mixture of both. Similarly their followers may put on uniform
when it suits them, especially when posing for propaganda pur-
poses as members of Latin American guerrilla organizations like
to do. Most of the time, though, they do what they can not to be
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conspicuous and merge with the surrounding population. As in-
deed they have to if they are not to be wiped out by the various
state-owned agencies, from the police to the military, that are ar-
rayed against them.
Third, since the organizations that wage them do not have regu-
lar, uniformed, bureaucratically-managed armed forces, the wars
in question do not see the use of large numbers of heavy, advan-
ced, weapons. Not making use of large numbers of heavy, advan-
ced weapons, they do not rely on extensive lines of communica-
tion. What is needed are not huge numbers of ships, trains and
lorries moving to the front and away from it but money and small
amounts of other equipment, much of which can be had almost
anywhere. As a result, the wars in question tend to be everywhere
and nowhere; as the Americans in Vietnam used to say, they we-
re waging a war „without fronts“. This proposition has a reverse
side that is equally important. The absence of fronts to attack,
and of lines of communication to cut, means that both heavy
weapons and strategy as traditionally understood are largely use-
less against them.
Fourth, the wars in question tend to take place not along some
„front“ but in the midst of the civilian population which, indeed,
is often deliberately subjected to attack in order to intimidate,
provoke, of simply inflict as much damage as possible. For this
reason the new wars, for all that they do not usually involve large
numbers of heavy, sophisticated weapons, tend to be at least as
bloody and destructive as the ones whose place they took. 9–11,
of course, is a perfect point in case. The number of casualties was
roughly equal to that which the Japanese inflicted in their attack
on Pearl Harbor; though the U.S Government, in the form of the
White House, and its military, in the form of the Pentagon, were
both targeted, the vast majority of them were civilians. The same
is even more true of other struggles of the same kind. Take the
number of people who died during the Algerian Civil War –
which, contrary to what we thought, appears to be ongoing still –
the Tamil struggle in Sri Lanka, the Uprising in East Timor, and
many similar conflicts around to world. All of them failed to dis-
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tinguish between combatants and noncombatants. With the result
that, by comparison, it would almost be true to say that the 1991
Gulf War was little but a picnic.
During the first few decades after 1945, the new kind of war was
limited almost entirely to what, at the time, was known as „The
Third World“. Being very strongly governed and not having co-
lonies, states belonging to the „Second World“ (also known as
the „East Block“) escaped them almost completely. By contrast,
so-called „developed“ or „First World“ states had a certain free-
dom of choice; in so far as outbreaks were limited almost entirely
to their colonies, they were in a position to either defend those
colonies or to withdraw from them. What set the period since
1990 or so apart is that the geography has been changing. From
its original abode in the Third World new kind of war has been
spreading into the Second World, playing havoc with the former
Yugoslavia as well as parts of the former USSR. Now, as the
events of 9–11 have so dramatically proved, it has reached the
First World as well. Even that part of it which considers itself to
be the most progressive, most disinterested, and most righteous
on earth; is separated from the rest by the two largest oceans on
earth; and had long considered itself invulnerable. Nor is there
any chance that our children and grandchildren will ever again be
free from the terrorist threat.
II.
How did we get to this point, and what factors are responsible for
the rise of the new kinds of war over the old? While historical
processes of the kind we are dealing with her are never simple,
one could start the discussion by considering the progressive de-
legitimization of conventional interstate war. The process, which
can be traced to the years immediately following World War I,
operated roughly as follows. First, there was a growing feeling
that modern war was too deadly and too destructive to be left to
the whims of sovereign states. This led to the establishment of
the League of Nations; the latter’s Covenant was the first formal
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document that recognized territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence as a fundamental international norm. Second, 1928
witnessed the signature of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in which the
U.S and France renounced the right to use war as a national in-
strument against each other. To be sure, neither the Covenant nor
the Pact made any difference when it came to preventing the out-
break World War II. Nevertheless their significance as indicators
of the way public opinion was going was considerable, which ex-
plains why the latter was ultimately signed by almost all of then-
existing states. As it gathered signatures, the Pact acquired legal
force much greater than its originators had ever hoped for.
Which, in turn, enabled it to be used as a basis for prosecuting
Nazi War Criminals at Nuremberg.
After the end of World War II, the movement towards de-legiti-
mizing interstate war accelerated. First came the establishment
of the United Nations whose Charter, signed by every member
state, prohibited „aggressive“ war and permitted it for self defen-
se only. The same Charter also prohibited the annexation of ter-
ritory by force, a prohibition that was later repeated several times
by Security Council Resolutions. As a result, terms such as „sub-
jugation“ and the „right of conquest“ disappeared from internati-
onal law; by now they sound as if they were taken from some an-
te-deluvian language more suitable to the state of nature than to
today’s civilization. As if all this were not enough, in 1950 for
the first time the United Nations for the first time formally decla-
red war. For forty years thereafter there was no repetition; in
1990, however, the next step was taken when the Security Coun-
cil voted in favor of War against Iraq. Since then, in theory at any
rate, any use of force by one state or another requires the prior ap-
proval of that body. States which chose to ignore that fact stood
in danger of being regarded as international pariahs and paying a
corresponding political price. Even, some would say particular-
ly, if they were strong.
As Thomas Hobbes once wrote4, covenants without swords are
but words. In this case, the damocles’ sword that backed up the
evolution of international law was the proliferation of nuclear
56
weapons. The first, and most awesome, introduction to what nu-
clear weapons could do came in August 1945 when Hiroshima
and Nagasaki were wiped out, leaving approximately 200,000
people dead. The devices in question represented the culmination
of a centuries-old quest by states towards more and more power-
ful weapons; however, once they had been tested and proven it
soon turned out that the results were very different from what had
been intended. In the words of the greatest post-1945 strategist,
Thomas Schelling5, what nuclear weapons really did was to cut
the link between victory and survival. Instead, they created a si-
tuation whereby a state could win a very great „victory“ and still
be turned into a smoking, radioactive desert. Worse, even; the
more decisive the defeat suffered by the losing side, the more li-
kely that side was to bring down the Temple on himself and his
enemy as Samson did.
At first nuclear weapons were only available to one country, the
United States, which once or twice threatened their use in order
to advance its interests in Iran and Berlin. After the Soviet Union
also tested its bomb in 1949, though, stalemate ensued. This was
not for want of trying. Between 1949 and the end of the Cold
War, and on both sides of the Iron Curtain, immense fortunes we-
re spent in an effort to make nuclear weapons usable. Countless
technologies were developed, scenarios written, and war-games
held. All had as their ultimate objective finding ways in which
one might use nuclear weapons against an opponent without ne-
cessarily blowing up the world.6 As far as we know, none was
ever able to produce convincing ways of doing so.
In time, what was true of the superpowers turned out to be even
truer of other states. First, fear of escalation meant that the super-
powers’ close allies in NATO and the Warsaw Pact became al-
most as secure against major conventional warfare as were the
superpowers themselves. Next, the Soviet Union and China
found themselves with their horns locked; in fact, one of the very
last things Michael Gorbachev did before surrendering power
was ratify a border-treaty with China. From the nineteen seven-
ties on the process reached China and India, causing relations
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between them to stabilize if not to become cordial. It prevented
anything larger but skirmishes from taking place between India
and Pakistan, and even brought some relief from interstate war to
that most strife-ridden region in the world, the Middle East.7 To
be sure, nuclear proliferation did not go so far as abolishing in-
terstate war completely. However, already now it has brought the
world to the point where such war is only possible between, or
against, rather weak states; of which Iraq, a third world country
of twenty million, anxiously waiting for an American attack, pro-
vides an excellent example.
While interstate war was being made less acceptable in theory as
well as much more dangerous in practice, other developments fa-
cilitated the emergence of the forms of non-state war discussed
above. Or those developments, the most important by far was
globalization. As with every major historical process, deciding
on the exact date when globalization got under way is difficult
and indeed some would argue that the world has always consti-
tuted a single global system in which every actor interacted more
or less closely with many of the rest.8 Be this as it may, for our
purposes globalization may have started in the nineteen sixties
with the advent of wide-bodied passenger jets. Other technologi-
cal advances such as the containerization of maritime transport,
cheap (later, portable as well) electronic communications, com-
puters, data-links, the Internet, and of course videotape satellite
TV accelerated the process. All provided unprecedented oppor-
tunities for moving people, merchandise, money and ideas at a
speed, and with a facility, never before achieved. All were also
backed up by an economic theory that emphasized the need to
avoid being tied to a single location in order to use opportunities
wherever and whenever they might occur.
Locked-in as they were within their traditional borders, which
they jealously guard, states by definition were only able to ex-
ploit these advances to a limited extent. Other organizations,
being non-territorial by nature, did much better. The nature of the
organizations in question differed greatly. Perhaps the most im-
portant ones were known as corporations, engaged in industry,
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and had as their objective the maximization of profit. Others
were ideological, others humanitarian, others criminal, and oth-
ers still criminal serving some political or religious cause, which
qualifies them as terrorists. Terrorists, in other words, were in
some ways better positioned to make use of some of the most im-
portant technological developments of our time than were tradi-
tional war-making entities, i.e. sovereign states. If only in the
sense that, in order to fly over a country or set up bases in it, they
did not have to ask for permission first.
Once again, the events of 9–11 provide a perfect illustration of
what is happening. As far as we know, the attacks on the Twin
Towers, the Pentagon, and the White House were planned by a
very small number of people who, at the time, were hunkering in
some remote Afghan cave. The enterprise – the term itself is iro-
nic – was financed by money coming from several Gulf States. It
was prepared by a small group of dedicated fanatics who, while
they resided in Hamburg, went to Afghanistan in order to obtain
training; at other times they did their best not to stand out too
much from their fellow students. Not content with what they
learnt in Afghanistan, some training was procured – on a purely
commercial basis, and without breaking any law – in Florida
where a few of those involved attended flight school. The final
effort at coordination took place among the casinos and whore-
houses of Las Vegas, after which the terrorists, having consulted
with Afghanistan for the last time, left for their designated air-
ports. The operation was sophisticated in some ways, but very
simple in others; at the point of impact all it took was readiness
for sacrifice, very strong nerves, and a few box cutters. None of
it would have been conceivable if Bin Laden and his organization
had not been able to make use of the ordinary communications-
and transportation technologies freely available to any citizen in
the developed countries and to many in the less developed ones
as well. Simple or sophisticated, the terrorists’ modus operandi
stands in sharp contrast to the hopeless inefficiency of the U.S
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Which, three months
after the event, was still busy issuing visas to terrorists who were
long since servicing virgins in heaven.
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The final factor behind the shift from conventional interstate war
to terrorism is the evolution of military technology itself. By and
large, the ability of states to monopolize violence in their own
hands was closely associated with the introduction of heavy,
crew-operated weapons, first cannon and then, after a long inter-
val, aircraft and tanks. Technological advances that have taken
place in recent decades have begun to reverse that trend, permit-
ting small parties of suitably trained men to wield vast destructi-
ve power. Some forms of the power in question may be had off
the shelf, as it were, in the form of simple chemicals and electro-
nic components. Some may be deployed by way of a telephone
link located thousands of miles away, as in the case of hackers
waging information warfare aimed at disrupting computer net-
works and the countless facilities that depend on them.9 Some
take the form of chemical and biological weapons. Such weapons
can be manufactured almost anywhere and are easily be transpor-
ted from one country to the next; although, fortunately and as ex-
perience in Tokyo and other places suggests, spreading them in
such a way as to lead to many casualties is not as simple as it
sounds. The most frightening possibility is that terrorists will lay
their hands on one or more of the thousands of nuclear weapons
now in the hands of several countries. And use them, say, to blow
up New York harbor after transporting them in one of the count-
less containers that arrive there every day.
III.
Given what is happening, what is to be done? One thing seems
abundantly clear: in fighting the new kinds of war, the armed
forces, doctrines, training methods and weapons that have been
developed for waging conventional war by one state against ano-
ther are only of limited use. New forces and methods will have
to be adopted, and the sooner the better. Naturally their exact na-
ture will vary from one country to another and also according to
the precise nature of the perceived threat. Even more than before,
many of the specific measures taken will have to remain classi-
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fied in order to minimize vulnerabilities. Still, by and large they
may be classified as follows.
First, a list of the most sensitive targets should be drawn up and
the targets in question hardened, as is already being done in the
case of airports, nuclear power plants, computing centers, and the
like. Such protection may be provided either by the military, the
police, or, which is most likely, some new organization that will
combine elements of both. In so far as protecting everything at
the same time is impossible, such a force cannot guarantee
against major attacks of the kind launched against the Moscow
theatre where thirty or so terrorists reached the building and took
it over. On the other hand, it can and should deal with many other
threats. For example, the hijackings of 9–11 could easily have
been prevented if there had been one or two sky marshals on each
aircraft. Crew members could have been made to carry weapons
and trained in their use; the doors between cockpit and passenger
cabin could have been reinforced and kept locked at all times, as
I myself suggested at the time I was working for Federal Avia-
tion Authority/Security. While the possibilities are infinite, the
essential point to keep in mind is that terrorists can only carry out
their operations by concealing their preparations. Accordingly,
even the deadliest attacks tend to be made by small parties of
more or less determined persons using weapons light enough to
be carried by hand or, at most, a single vehicle. This, of course,
is just what makes them so hard to detect; but it also means that,
quite often, simple measures can save many lives at trivial cost.
Second, specialized intelligence organizations should be set up
to detect terrorist attacks ahead of time and prevent them from ta-
king place. As configured at present, neither military intelligence
nor the police are exactly suitable for the purpose. The former
date back to the late unlamented Cold War and tends to focus on
the regular forces of foreign countries, counting tanks, locating
bases, and stealing plans. The latter are geared to dealing with
crime and normally come into action only after it has been com-
mitted and reported. Either those services will have to mend their
ways, or new ones will have to be established, organized and trai-
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ned in such a way that they can take pro-active action. Once this
is done, it will also be necessary to make sure that they coordina-
te with the existing organizations rather than obstruct them or du-
plicate their work; as always, problems of command and control
will be critical.
Third, dealing with terrorist incidents is not a job that any soldier
or policeman can do. Instead, it demands specially trained and
equipped units. Most countries, Germany included, already have
such units, but much more could and should be done. Once again,
careful thought should be given to the question of command and
control, i.e. the kind of authority that will run and activate the
units in question. Equally important, it is vital to have them at
hand where and when needed; in other words, the necessary ve-
hicles, helicopters, and communications should be considered
and made available.
Like any other special craft, waging the kind of war that terrorism
represents requires specialized tools. Buildings may be altered to
make them harder to enter, aircraft modified so as to provide bet-
ter protection against hijackings or anti-aircraft missiles, and me-
dical facilities prepared to receive and treat injured people. For
example, the gas used by the Russian forces to neutralize the ter-
rorists may have been too powerful for the purpose at hand. How-
ever, the idea of using an anesthetic in order to deal with hostage
taking situations is sound. If 100 hostages died, this was less be-
cause of the means used than because the rescue forces were ap-
parently not prepared to deal with so many incapacitated people;
neither having ambulances ready, nor informing doctors what
measures they should take, nor preparing sufficient quantities of
antidotes.10 Other measures might do their work by subjecting ter-
rorists to noise, blinding light, and the like.11 At a minimum, the
knowledge that the security forces possess such means will make
the work of terrorists more complicated; it will force them to pre-
pare countermeasures and thus reduce both their effectiveness
and their endurance. Accordingly, such weapons should be made
the object of a well-funded, well-organized, sustained, and secret
program of research and development.
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To enable the various anti-terrorist units to do their work, the
existing legal framework of democratic countries in particular
may have to be modified. Governments and the intelligence ser-
vices they employ may have to be given greater powers to moni-
tor communications, search for evidence, and arrest suspects not
after they have acted but before they can do so; attempts to mo-
dify the law in this direction are already under way in many
countries.12 However, there is a catch. The obvious dangers to de-
mocracy and freedom apart, experience shows that laws which
ride roughshod over human rights will only alienate people. In
extreme cases they may even drive them into the terrorists’ arms;
as in all things, it is a question of striking a balance.
Finally, all of the above measures depend on very close interna-
tional cooperation. As already noted, in today’s globalized world
one of the main advantages terrorists enjoy is the fact that they
are not tied to any specific location or country but are able to mo-
ve from one to another as their safety and operational needs re-
quire. If they want to succeed, the forces deployed against them
will have to be equally mobile and equally cooperative; opera-
ting across borders, resolving disputes over sovereignty, setting
up common communications and command systems, and so on.
All of this requires considerable preparation, and little of it can
be improvised in a hurry. One might, indeed, argue that of all
obstacles facing counter-terrorism this one is the most difficult
one to overcome.
As the newly established American Department of Home Secu-
rity with its $ 38 billion budget shows, combating terrorism will
not be cheap. On the other hand, doing so will hardly be more ex-
pensive than maintaining today’s conventional armed forces, the
Bundeswehr included, with all their highly paid generals, large
units, heavy weapons, enormous logistic infrastructure, exercise
grounds, and the like. States should therefore ask whether those
armed forces are still relevant and which parts of them can be dis-
solved; whether, for example, it is the Eurofighter or a new gene-
ration of machines capable of detecting explosives, chemical
agents, and radioactive materials that is needed most. As they
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manage the shift from one kind of force to the other, it is impor-
tant that governments look after the people they discharge. Or el-
se, driven to penury, some of those people may well become ter-
rorists themselves.
IV.
To end on a slightly more optimistic note, none of the above is
meant to say that civilization will be washed away in mighty
waves of anarchy. Throughout human history, for reasons that
are rooted deep in our nature and almost certainly cannot be era-
dicated, armed struggles have broken out now here, now there.
Some of the struggles in question lasted for a long time and were
extremely deadly to participants and bystanders alike. Think of
the Hundred Years War or, in the German speaking part of Euro-
pe, of the Thirty Years War. The former caused entire districts to
be laid waste; the latter is supposed to have killed off as many as
one third of the population. While the fate of the people involved
was often almost too terrible to contemplate, few if any geogra-
phical regions have been permanently in a state of war, let alone
reduced to the point where they could no longer sustain human
life. After all, after the Romans had strewn its soil with salt even
Carthage ended up by being rebuilt. As has been said13, not the
least surprising thing about 9–11 is the fact that, 24 hours after it
took place, 99.5 percent of all Americans were going about their
business, more or less.
As things gradually change, compared to the period 1945–2000
life in the most advanced countries will almost certainly become
less pleasant. It will also become less secure, and more preoccu-
pied with security. Much of that security will take the form of
petty harassment. Immigration procedures will be, indeed alrea-
dy are being, tightened up as form is piled on form, check on
check, and bureaucrat on bureaucrat. People will be asked to pro-
duce documents and punished if, in the ones they do produce, the
name of their grandmother is mistakenly spelt in the wrong way.
They will be searched upon entering movie houses and super-
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markets, made to take off their shoes and deprived of their nail-
cutters as they try to board an aircraft, and so on. Much of this
will be both time-consuming and pointless; after all, every queue
formed by people waiting to have their persons and belongings
checked is also a target. From time to time, they will watch a ter-
rorist act taking place somewhere else. Some who happened to
be in the neighborhood will call their relatives to assure them that
they are OK, an experience I actually had as I was working on
this paper. Others will stop for a moment, tell themselves how
sorry they feel for the victims, offer silent thanks for the fact that
they and theirs were not involved, and get back to their business
as usual. As our children grow up they will take all of this very
much for granted. For good or ill, they will be used, not to say
inured, to the suffering around them; told about a time when peo-
ple could enter restaurants, banks, and other public places wit-
hout being searched first, they will shake their heads in disbelief.
Most of the time, and barring terrorist use of weapons of mass de-
struction, compared to what most of those same countries went
through in 1914–45 it will probably not be too bad. If it is true
that 3,000 people died in 9–11, it is also true that during the six
years of World War II 20,000 people died every day; what can be
worse than Hiroshima, or Hamburg, or Dresden?
While many people have much to lose from the brave new world
now emerging, it is important to emphasize that many others ha-
ve equally much to gain. For example, anyone who can provide
security against terrorism, or looks as if he can do so, will see de-
mand for his products and/or services skyrocketing; military men
who fear unemployment owing to ongoing budget cuts, take no-
te. Even at present, people who can talk well about terrorism are
certain to attract listeners both inside universities and outside
them. There are millions, perhaps more, to be made out a kit that
is able to identify anthrax and perhaps other biological agents
quickly and at a cost most people can afford. Already now, seve-
ral companies are racing one another to see which of them will
put the first devices on the market; the same is true of automatic
face-recognition systems, foolproof I.D cards, and much more.
There are more millions to be made, and any number of jobs to
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be created, by protecting everything from skyscrapers to water-
reservoirs and from private residences to entire neighborhoods.
As is always the case during times of profound upheaval ever-
ything will change, yet at another level everything will remain
much the same. It therefore seems appropriate to end this essay
by quoting a verse by Mao Tze Dong, referring to what would
happen in the aftermath of nuclear war:
The sun will keep rising
Trees will keep growing
And women will continue to have children.
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